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1990 ANNUAL ANTITRUST REVIEW
Annual Antitrust Reviews have been presented at the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York since 1948, when Professor Milton

Handler instituted the series. The 1990 Review was presented on November 14, 1990, and the following articles are based on those

presentations.
TRIAL LAWYERS AND

AR CO: JURISPRUDENTIALLY INCONSISTENT

APPROACHES To PER SE ILLEGALITY

by Michael Malina*
INTRODUCTION

rT[IHEgantitrust history of the past fifteen years has seen a marked--one
X might even say remarkable-resurgence of the Rule of Reason as the
governing criterion of illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
Commencing with its landmark 1977 decision in Continental T V. Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.,2 the Supreme Court has resuscitated the Rule of Reason from a standard often honored more in the breach than in the application to the flexible and pragmatic doctrine that its authors envisioned.
This development was by no means limited to the vertical restraints involved in the Sylvania case. Decisions like BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSystem 3 and National CollegiateAthletic Association
v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma4 suggested that the
Court intended to apply the newly revitalized Rule of Reason to appropriate horizontal restraints as well-indeed, even to some forms of price
fixing. One can well imagine the reactions that Justices Black and Douglas-the champions of the per se approach to most Section 1 restraintswould have had.
This seemingly straight-line expansion of the Rule of Reason at the
expense of per se rules appears to have taken a slight detour in the past
Supreme Court Term. More particularly, in FTC v. Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Association,5 a six-Justice majority applied the per se rule against
horizontal price fixing in language reminiscent of Justices Black and
Douglas at their most severe, even going so far as to quote approvingly
from Douglas' famous-or perhaps infamous-footnote 59 in United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.6
Even more interesting is the Court's apparently inconsistent jurispru*
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
493 U.S. 411 (1990).
310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940).
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dential approach to the question of when per se rules ought to be applied
and, more significantly, why. Emerson taught that foolish consistency is
the hobgoblin of little minds.7 While no one would argue that the
Supreme Court should strive for consistency when the end result is foolishness, it is certainly not foolish to expect the Court to apply consistent
approaches to common issues in the same Term. Yet, for this reader, the
two decisions of the past Term that dealt with price fixing defy
rationalization.
I refer to the six-to-three decision in FTC v. Superior Court TrialLawyers Association, which held that a boycott by court-appointed attorneys
in the District of Columbia constituted a per se unlawful price-fixing
agreement because it was intended to increase the price that the District
paid for the lawyers' services;' I also refer to the seven-to-two decision
five months later in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., which
held that a competitor could not, as a matter of law, establish antitrust
injury caused by a vertical conspiracy among a supplier and its dealers to
charge low, but not predatory, prices in an effort to drive the plaintiff out
of business.' ° While at first blush these decisions may not appear to be
inconsistent-or even to deal with the same question-upon closer analysis, a jurisprudential inconsistency in the application of the per se rule is
readily apparent.
A.

FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association

The operative facts of the Trial Lawyers case were stated by the
Supreme Court in a single sentence: "a group of lawyers agreed not to
represent indigent criminal defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court until the District of Columbia government increased the lawyers' compensation."" That statement may be accurate, but it hardly
does justice to the factual context of the Court's ruling.
In eighty-five
percent of the annual 25,000 criminal cases brought against indigent defendants in the District of Columbia, the accused is represented by a lawyer in private practice appointed and compensated pursuant to the
District's Criminal Justice Act. While more than 1,200 attorneys have
registered for such appointments, most of the appointments go to a group
of some one-hundred "CJA regulars" who "derive almost all of their
income from representing indigents."' 2
The compensation paid to these attorneys is set by a Joint Committee
on Judicial Administration. The Committee has statutory authority to
provide rates not exceeding those established by the Criminal Justice Act
7.
(1903).
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

See Emerson, Self-Reliance, in The Complete Works of Ralph Waldo Emerson 57
See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 416-17.
494 U.S. 411 (1990).
See id. at 1891.
FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 413 (1990).
Id. at 414.
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of 1964-rates that are unquestionably low by current standards of attorney compensation: thirty dollars per hour for court time and twenty dollars per hour for out-of-court time. Under this regulatory scheme, CJA
regulars could not get a rate increase unless Congress amended the federal statute or the District's government amended the District Code. 3
Starting in 1982, the Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, together with other bar groups, sought unsuccessfully to persuade the District government to increase rates to at least thirty-five dollars per hour.
When attempts at persuasion failed, an organized boycott ensued. The
lawyers agreed to decline new appointments until the District passed legislation increasing their fees. Unlike the typical Section 1 case, there was
no issue as to the existence of an agreement. This one was in writingalmost one hundred lawyers signed a petition stating that "'unless we
are granted a substantial increase in our hourly rate we will cease accepting new appointments under the Criminal Justice Act.' "14
Pursuant to that agreement, approximately ninety percent of the CJA
regulars refused to accept new assignments. Within a few days, the remaining lawyers were overloaded, and in little more than a week key
figures in the District's criminal justice system had concluded that it was
"'on the brink of collapse.' "I' The mayor agreed, and after meeting
with the Association's leaders, offered an immediate temporary increase
to thirty-five dollars per hour, to be followed by a permanent increase to
fifty-five dollars for court time and forty-five dollars for out-of-court
time. The lawyers accepted the proposal. The next day the city council
passed a bill embodying the new rates, and the lawyers began to accept
16
new assignments.
Over the dissent of Commissioner Pertschuk, 7 who felt it was an unwise use of the Commission's scarce resources, the FTC filed a complaint
against the Association and four of its officers, asserting a violation of
Section 5 of the FTC Act by virtue of "a conspiracy to fix prices and to
conduct a boycott."' 8 After a three week trial, the Administrative Law
Judge found the facts alleged in the complaint proved and rejected all of
the Association's legal defenses. He nevertheless dismissed the complaint because the District's officers, who after all represented the boycott's victim, recognized that its net effect was beneficial in that higher
rates would attract more lawyers, reduce caseloads and, accordingly, result in better representation for indigent defendants.' 9
That pragmatic conclusion did not fare very well with the Commis13. See id.
14. Id. at 414-15 (quoting the court it reversed, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n
v.FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
15. Id. at 415 (quoting In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 107 F.T.C. 510, 544

(1986)).
16.
17.
18.
19.

See id. at 415.
In re Superior Court Trial Lawyers Association, 107 F.T.C. 510, 512-13 (1986).
Id. at 511.
"I see no point in striving resolutely for an antitrust triumph in this sensitive area
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sion, which reversed the ALJ's dismissal, holding that the lawyers' concerted refusal to deal had the "purpose and effect of raising prices" and
was therefore per se illegal.2" On appeal, however, the D.C. Circuit vacated the Commission's order.2 1
While the court of appeals agreed that the boycott was a classic restraint of trade, it concluded that the agreement contained an element of
expression warranting first amendment protection. 22 Once first amendment values appeared in the decisional calculus, expression could be restricted only to the extent necessary to protect an important
governmental interest.2 3 Under that rubric, the court of appeals held
that the lawyers' boycott could not be condemned by application of a per
se rule.24 Rather, the Commission would have to prove "that the evil
against which the Sherman Act is directed looms in the conduct" 2 under
challenge. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case to the Commission to determine whether the boycotting lawyers possessed sufficient
market power to produce a substantial anticompetitive effect-in other
words, for a determination of legality under the Rule of Reason.2 6
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, a six-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court reversed .2 For Justice Stevens, the issue before the Court was a
simple one: does the per se rule against horizontal price fixing apply
when the agreement is implemented by organizing a seller's boycott
against a buyer that happens to be an organ of government? His answer
was equally simple: a resounding affirmative in language quite familiar to
those who learned normative antitrust doctrine in the 1960s. The opinion reads like a primer in the per se illegality of horizontal price fixing
arrangements. In a nutshell, the majority held that an agreement among
sellers of a service to withhold their services from the marketplace until
the buyer pays a higher price for them is a classic price-fixing agreement
condemned by the per se rule ever since United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co.2 more than sixty years ago.
For the three dissenters-Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmunthe issue in Trial Lawyers was more closely related to first amendment
principles than to the jurisprudence of the Sherman Act. 29 Because the
when the particular case can be disposed of on a more pragmatic basis-there was no
harm done." Id. at 561.
20. See id. at 573.
21. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 253 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).
22. See id. at 248.
23. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
24. See Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 856 F.2d at 248-50.
25. Id. at 250-53.
26. See id. at 250.
27. See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768, 770 (1990). Joining Justice Stevens were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia
and Kennedy.
28. 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
29. See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 430-34.
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boycotted party was the government of the District of Columbia and the
direct objective of the conspirators was to persuade that governmental
organ to make a legislative decision to increase lawyers' rates, the boycott was a form of expression implicating freedom of speech concerns.
As the dissenters saw it, a per se rule of illegality was inappropriate in
those circumstances. Rather, Justice Brennan argued, the court of appeals' solution to the apparent conflict between first amendment concerns
and Sherman Act doctrine was a fair compromise: apply the Rule of
Reason and condemn the expressive political boycott only if it is proved
that the lawyers actually exercised market power to coerce a higher
price, rather than merely to persuade the District government to change
its mind as a political matter.3
Because all nine Justices agreed on all but one section of the majority
opinion-and that disagreement turned on the interplay between the
Sherman Act and the first amendment, not on the substance of antitrust
doctrine-analysis of the decision's doctrinal importance must commence with an examination of Justice Stevens' opinion, focusing first on
those portions of the opinion that the entire Court endorsed.
Justice Stevens begins with a preface noting that the wisdom of the
Commission's proceeding against the lawyers was open to substantial
question. "Reasonable lawyers," he writes, "may differ about the wisdom of this enforcement proceeding.... Respondents' boycott may well
have served a cause that was worthwhile and unpopular. We may assume that the preboycott rates were unreasonably low, and that the increase has produced better legal representation for indigent
defendants."'" He goes on, however, to state that these "assumptions do
not control the case, for it is not our task to pass upon the social utility or
political wisdom of price-fixing agreements." 32 That statement, by a
unanimous Supreme Court, is hardly news. It has been the view of the
Court since Trenton Potteries that the legislative judgment condemning
price fixing takes the issue of such conduct's potential social desirability
out of the judicial ambit. The question, rather, has been just what conduct should be labeled as price fixing.
On that question-whether the lawyers' boycott constituted price fixing-the Court was also unanimous. Justice Stevens writes that the boycott was " 'a classic restraint of trade within the meaning of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act,' , quoting the court of appeals for that uncontroversial proposition. Continuing in that vein, the opinion states: "Prior to
the boycott CJA lawyers were in competition with one another, each deciding independently whether and how often to offer to provide services
30. See id. at 433-34.
31. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 417 (1990).
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C.
Cir. 1988)).
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to the District at CJA rates." 34 That sentence leaves substantial room
for controversy. To be sure, before the boycott was organized each of the
CJA lawyers made his own decision as to whether and when to accept
appointments to represent indigent defendants. But is it really accurate
to describe the situation as "competition"? The lawyers certainly were
not competitors in the every-day sense of the term. The price was set by
law by a governmental monopsonist. This was not competition in the
traditional sense of a marketplace where one seller tries to persuade a
buyer to purchase from him rather than from his competitor by offering a
better price, a better product or a better service. This was a take-it-orleave-it situation for the attorneys. In many respects the market bore a
greater resemblance to a regulated industry than to a competitive model,
in that the price was set by governmental decision rather than by market
forces of supply and demand. Given the case's unusual context, it seems
somewhat bizarre for the Court to speak of "competition" among the
lawyers and then to decide the case on the basis of principles applicable
to competitive markets and of marginal utility in analyzing markets subject to regulation.3"
Justice Stevens, still for a unanimous Court, goes on to tell us that the
boycott agreement "was designed to obtain higher prices for [the attorneys'] services and was implemented by a concerted refusal to serve an
important customer."3 6 Such conduct, he writes, is a "constriction of
supply [which] is 'the essence of "price-fixing," whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price
offered.' "" Quoting his 1978 opinion in NationalSociety of Professional
Engineers v. United States,3" Stevens concludes that the "Sherman Act
reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce
not only lower prices, but also better goods and services. ' '39 While that is
certainly a fair statement of the theory underlying the competitive marketplace (and hence the antitrust regime designed to protect it), its relevance in the context of this case is highly questionable.
As noted above, it was not competition among the Association lawyers
that kept the price of their services low; it was statutory mandate. These
sellers of legal services were price takers, not price makers; and it was
legislative fiat, not the marketplace, that set the price they could accept
or reject. Justice Stevens' very next sentence-also quoted from Professional Engineers-seemingly compounds his error in perception. The
34. Id.
35. See, eg., Town of Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22, 25-29 (1st Cir.
1990) (price squeeze did not violate Sherman Act when electrical utility's prices were
subject to primary and secondary regulation), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1337 (1991).
36. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S.Ct. 768, 775 (1990).
37. Id. at 775 (quoting the court it reversed, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v.
FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)).
38. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
39. Trial Lawyers, 110 S. Ct. at 775 (quoting ProfessionalEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695).
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legislative judgment in favor of competition, he writes, "recognizes that
all elements of a bargain--quality, service, safety, and durability-and
not just the immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among alternative offers."'' One might well ask "what alternative offers?" The Court's statement is axiomatic in the normal
competitive situation where sellers compete with one another on the basis
of price, quality and service. But here, there was a substantial demand
for the lawyers' services and not enough lawyers to satisfy it. 4 1 The District government set the price that the sellers of those services had to
accept or leave the market. There simply were no alternative offers, nor
could there be under the applicable regulatory regime.
In his zeal to reaffirm the vitality of per se price-fixing principles, Justice Stevens applied them to this extraordinary set of facts by engaging in
what Karl Llewellyn labeled "lump concept" thinking. 4 It does not do
justice to antitrust doctrines--even one as basic as the inherently anticompetitive nature of horizontal price fixing agreements-to apply
them full blown and without discriminating analysis to unique circumstances. Given the admittedly questionable wisdom of bringing the case
in the first place as well as the concrete public benefits that unquestionably flowed from the defendants' conduct, the rigidity of per se treatment
appears out of keeping with a mature and flexible jurisprudence. This is
not, however, to suggest that the legality of this boycott cannot sensibly
be assessed under a per se rule. The point is that whatever one's view of
the matter may be, it is not appropriate to treat this case as merely a
routine example of garden variety cartelization.
Still speaking for a unanimous Court, the majority opinion proceeds to
dispose of the attorneys' contention that their conduct constituted political petitioning beyond the scope of the Sherman Act under the NoerrPennington doctrine.'3 As Justice Stevens explained," that issue was
controlled by the 1988 decision in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian
Head, Inc.'5 Indianhead made it clear that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects otherwise unlawful concerted conduct only where the restraint that lessens competition is the consequence of governmental
action and the private conspiracy is merely a means of seeking a
40. Id.
41. Indeed, this market's anticipated behavior appears to be the antithesis of the competitive model, in that an increase in price would not be likely to result in a diminution of
output, and might well produce an increase by inducing more attorneys to accept appointments to represent indigents.
42. See, e.g., K. Llewellyn, Cases and Materials On The Law Of Sales xiv (1930)
(referring to treatment of the concept of title "as a lump").
43. The doctrine derives from a trio of Supreme Court decisions: Eastern R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking
Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
44. See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 419 (1990).
45. 486 U.S. 492 (1988).
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favorable governmental response.46 Because the lawyers' boycott directly restrained the market for lawyers' services, the Trial Lawyers
Court reasoned, Noerr simply did not apply.47
That brought Justice Stevens to the first amendment issue. Significantly, the core of that discussion-including his distinction of NAACP v.
ClaiborneHardware Co. 4 8 -continues to speak for a unanimous Court.
Claiborne, decided in 1982, held that the first amendment protected a
boycott by black citizens of white merchants in a Mississippi county
against challenge under state law. The Court in Claiborne reasoned as
follows: the " 'right of the States to regulate economic activity could not
justify a complete prohibition against a nonviolent, politically motivated
boycott designed to force governmental and economic change and to effectuate rights guaranteed by the Constitution itself.' ,49 The boycotting
lawyers argued that their case fell within Claiborne because their conduct
was politically motivated and sought to vindicate the Constitutional
rights of accused indigents to the assistance of counsel." The Court disagreed. The fundamental distinction, Justice Stevens stated, was that the
lawyers' objective "was an economic advantage for those who agreed to
participate" 5 1-higher prices for their services. In Claiborne, on the
other hand, the persons who joined the boycott of white merchants
"sought no special advantage for themselves." 52 As for the claim that
the purpose of the lawyers' boycott was the vindication of indigent defendants' rights, the Court declared that Claiborne "does not, and could
not, establish a rule immunizing from prosecution any boycott based
upon sincere constitutional concerns." 3 A rule of constitutional law
that would protect so-called expressive boycotts from economic regulation when the boycotted parties do not seek anything for themselves
raises a number of interesting first amendment questions. Insofar as antitrust is concerned, however, and with the possible exception of issues
concerning the applicability of the Sherman Act in such situations to
non-profit institutions, the holding in Trial Lawyers is not likely to have
great doctrinal significance.
That brings us to the section of Justice Stevens' opinion that produced
the split in the Court and an impassioned dissent from Justice Brennan
46. See id. at 502-07.
47. See Trial Lawyers, 493 U.S. at 419. As Justice Stevens put it:
The restraint of trade that was implemented while the boycott lasted would
have had precisely the same anticompetitive consequences during that period
even if no legislation had been enacted. In Noerr, the desired legislation would
have created the restraint on the truckers' competition; in this case the emergency legislative response to the boycott put an end to the restraint.
Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

458 U.S. 886 (1982).
TrialLawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 419-20 (1990) (quoting Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 914).
See id. at 419-20.
Id. at 420.
Id.
Id. 420 n.1l.
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on first amendment grounds. At this stage of the analysis, the entire
Court had agreed that the boycott was a classic horizontal restraint of
trade that would ordinarily violate Section 1; that the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine was inapplicable; and that the expressive qualities of the concerted action did not give rise to a complete first amendment shield
against antitrust liability. The only remaining issue was whether the
court of appeals was correct in rejecting the applicability of a per se rule
on a theory that Justice Stevens himself deemed "creative." '
In its 1968 decision in United States v. O'Brien," the Supreme Court
clarified the standard for government regulation of expressive conduct.
O'Brien held that the government may regulate expressive conduct-in
that case, the burning of the defendant's draft card--consonant with the
first amendment only if the restriction on freedom of expression is no
greater than necessary to further the governmental interest in regulation.
Applying that rule to the lawyers' boycott, the D.C. Circuit held that the
expressive component of the boycott compelled the court to apply the
Sherman Act "with a special solicitude for" the attorneys' first amendment rights.5 6 According to Judge Ginsburg, it followed that the government's interest in prohibiting anticompetitive boycotts did not justify
restricting the communicative element of this conduct unless it was
proved that the boycotters in fact possessed market power-in other
words, that the first amendment itself prohibited application of a per se
rule. As Justice Stevens paraphrased the court of appeals' holding, the
lower court "ruled that per se antitrust analysis was inapplicable to boycotts having an expressive component." 57
The majority rejected that approach out of hand, finding "two critical
flaws in the Court of Appeals' antitrust analysis." 8 First, the Court concluded that Judge Ginsburg had exaggerated the expressive component
of the boycott by assuming that most economic boycotts do not have an
expressive component; and second, the Court found that he had denigrated the importance of the per se rule against price fixing by assuming
that it is merely a rule of administrative convenience serving no meaningful governmental purpose in the absence of market power.59
On the first point, the majority stated categorically that "[e]very concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an
expressive component." ' The Court noted that all conspiracies in restraint of trade, including the "most blatant, naked price-fixing agreement[s]," are the product of communication and that boycotts in
particular always convey an expressive message:" 'we will not do busi54. See id. at 417.

55. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
56. See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC, 856 F.2d 226, 233-34 (D.C. Cir.
1988), rev'd, 493 U.S. 411 (1990).

57. TrialLawyers, 493 U.S. 411, 421 (1990).
58. Id.

59. See id.
60. Id.
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ness [with you] until you do what we ask.' ,61 According to the majority, because all boycotts have this expressive element, an exception that
affords special treatment to those with expressive components would
swallow the rule,6 2 creating what Justice Stevens called a "gaping hole in
the fabric" of the antitrust laws.63
This analysis, however, disregards a significant difference between the
boycott in question and the typical economic boycott. In this case, the
boycotted party was the government of the District of Columbia, and the
desired result of the attorneys' efforts was the legislation needed to raise
their rates of pay. That made the conspiracy here a political act, a point
not lost on the dissenters.' For Justice Stevens to conclude blithely that
there is "nothing unique about the 'expressive component' of respondents' boycott ' 65 ignores the special character of this case in the name of
reaffirming the Court's intention to apply the per se rule against all horizontal cartelization with full force. But it does not follow necessarily
that courts must treat boycotts designed to generate a political response
in the identical manner as those without that special feature. Nor does it
advance the inquiry to avoid the question by asserting that a political
element in the boycott is not present.
It is in Justice Stevens' discussion of what he perceives as the second
flaw in the court of appeals' decision that the case's future impact on
antitrust jurisprudence will most likely lie. The court of appeals had assumed, he writes, that " 'the antitrust laws permit, but do not require,
the condemnation of price fixing [and boycotts] without proof of market
power;' "66 and that even "theperse rule. . . 'is only a rule of administrative convenience and efficiency, not a statutory command.' ",67 According to the Supreme Court majority, this statement is wrong on both
counts.
Justice Stevens views the per se rules as if they had been expressly
included in the statute that Congress passed and the President signed in
1890: "[t]he per se rules are, of course, the product of judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act, but the rules nevertheless have the same force
and effect as any other statutory commands." '68 Justice Douglas or Justice Black could not have said it in any stronger words. Justice Stevens
rejects with equal fervor the idea that administrative convenience, while
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. Id. at 421-22.
64. As stated by Justice Brennan, "[w]hen a boycott seeks to generate public support
for the passage of legislation, it may operate on a political rather than economic level,
especially when the Government is the target." Id. at 427 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
65. Id. at 421-22.
66. Id. at 422.
67. Id. (quoting the court it reversed, Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n v. FTC,
856 F.2d 226, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
68. Id. at 422.
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admittedly one of the reasons underlying the development of per se rules,
is their sole justification. He notes that "[e]very [boycott and price fixing
arrangement] among competitors poses some threat to the free market"; 69 and, he continues, a "small conspirator may be able to impede
competition over some period of time"-a period that "can be long
enough to inflict real injury upon particular consumers or
competitors."7 °
Taking this statement at face value, the Court maintains that the mere
possibility that a price-fixing agreement among small competitors with no
market power might ultimately have an anticompetitive effect is sufficient
justification to condemn all such agreements, even if there is no proof
that the agreement in question is likely to produce the prohibited result.
Then, to put the icing on the cake, Justice Stevens quotes at length from
footnote 59 of Justice Douglas' opinion in Socony-Vacuum, perhaps the
strongest statement of the per se rule in all of the United States Reports:
Price-fixing agreements may or may not be aimed at complete elimination of price competition. The group making those agreements may or
may not have power to control the market.... Whatever economic
justification particular price-fixing agreements may be thought to have,
the law does not permit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are
all banned because of their actual
71 or potential threat to the central
nervous system of the economy.
Having just proscribed all horizontal price fixing, regardless of who
the price fixers may be or how negligible their power to influence the
market, the opinion proceeds, in its final paragraph, to raise a troubling
question as to whether the majority really meant what it had just said.
Justice Stevens tells us that one cannot assume that "absent proof of market power, the boycott disclosed by this record was totally harmless ....
Conspirators need not achieve the dimensions of a monopoly, or even a
degree of market power any greater than that already disclosed by this
record, to warrant condemnation under the antitrust laws."'7 2 If "market
power" means enough power to affect prices in the marketplace, this very
last sentence suggests that there might be cases in which the price fixers'
market power is so small-less market power than disclosed by the record in the case before the Court-that per se condemnation would not be
warranted. And that, with due respect to Justice Stevens, is precisely
what the rest of the opinion has gone to extraordinary lengths to tell us
will never be the case. Put another way, the opinion's final paragraph
suggests that there was, in fact, a sufficient showing that the boycotting
lawyers had enough market power to coerce the desired result--exactly
what the Court had just concluded was unnecessary for condemnation
69.
70.
71.
225-26
72.

Id. at 423.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 423-24 (quoting United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
n.59 (1940)).
Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
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under the per se rule.7 3
What does all this add up to? To begin with, the Court has reaffirmed
its long-standing adherence to the per se illegality of horizontal price fixing. That alone is hardly surprising, although there were indications in
cases like BMI and NCAA that the traditional breadth of the rule might
some day be constricted. It suffices to note that, at least as to horizontal
price fixing arrangements, we are squarely alongside Socony- Vacuum, if
indeed we ever left it. Thus, an agreement between two comer grocery
stores to raise the price of coffee by five cents a pound continues to be a
per se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, even if all the shoppers
in the area can go to any of a dozen neighboring supermarkets and buy
their coffee at the pre-conspiracy lower price. Whatever the extent of the
Chicago School's influence on antitrust doctrine may be, it now seems
clear that this fundamental principle remains steadfast. Nor does there
appear to be any room for a "defensive combination" or "countervailing
power" defense to a horizontal price fixing agreement. If the Court is
saying anything in Trial Lawyers, it surely is announcing that the law
remains as it has been for decades: price fixing among sellers is unlawful
no matter how insignificant the conspirators' position in the marketplace.
One might well ask whether the same broad-brush approach would be
applied to an arrangement among buyers to limit the price they are willing to pay for goods or services. For example, would Justice Stevens and
the Supreme Court majority apply the per se rule to a consumer boycott
designed to drive prices down? Suppose two homemakers decide that
they are fed up with the high price of coffee at the A&P and agree not to
buy that product there until the store's management lowers the price by
five cents a pound. Would the TrialLawyers Court condemn that agreement as per se illegal price fixing without regard to the conspirators'
manifest inability to produce a significant market impact? A number of
cases do appear to treat buyer price fixing less harshly than the seller
variety.7 4 As a matter of theory, however, it is hard to see why there
should be any great difference-unless one concludes, with our friends
73. Interestingly, in his separate dissent Justice Blackmun takes a diametrically opposing view. As he sees it, the attorneys had no market power at all because, in the
exercise of its supervisory powers over the bar, the Superior Court could have ordered
them to take the cases pro bono. Because he agreed with Justices Brennan and Marshall
that there should be no illegality without a showing of market power, he would have
remanded the case with instructions that the Commission's complaint be dismissed. See
id. at 433-34 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
74. See, &g., Webster County Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. United Mine Workers of
America Welfare & Retirement Fund of 1950, 536 F.2d 419, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (fund's
decision to restrict beneficiaries to emergency cases did not violate antitrust laws); Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289, 292-93 (9th Cir. 1971)
(agreement between Ford and car dealers' association to deal with only one corporation
did not violate antitrust laws), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972). But see Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948) ("The Act is
comprehensive... protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated.").
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from Chicago, that antitrust is concerned only with conduct that is likely
to increase prices and thus injure consumers. That, I suggest, is precisely
what Justice Stevens' opinion in Trial Lawyers tells us is not the case.
Price fixing is bad because it tampers with the "central nervous system"
of the economy. It is the market, not the conspirators, that must set the
price; thus it matters not whether prices will necessarily be raised,
thereby injuring consumers. If that is the case, the per se rule should
apply with equal force whether the conspirators are buyers or sellers.
There is another noteworthy point. Justice Brennan's dissent, while
focusing primarily on the first amendment issue he and his colleagues see
raised by the antitrust condemnation of a political boycott, questions the
majority decision on another ground. Justice Brennan argues that per se
treatment runs counter to a recent line of decisions applying the Rule of
Reason to boycotts 7 5-principally his own ruling in Northwest Wholesale
Stationers,Ina v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co. 6
Just as the majority paid insufficient attention to the dissent's stress on
the political nature of the boycott, here the dissenters carefully disregard
Justice Stevens' principal point: that the action by the Trial Lawyers
Association was not simply a horizontal boycott, but a concerted refusal
to deal for the purpose of raising the price, a refusal that implicates the
rule against price fixing. Neither Northwest Wholesale Stationersnor any
of the other boycott cases cited by the dissent involved price fixing concerns, a point that the majority opinion notes in a footnote to which the
dissenters do not respond."
In the final analysis, probably the most significant attribute of the Trial
Lawyers opinion is its rhetoric. The absolutism of Justice Stevens' affirmation of the per se rule against price fixing heralds a departure from the
tone of recent Supreme Court antitrust opinions. Perhaps, as Eleanor
Fox has recently suggested,7" the Court is in the process of resolving a
conflict between two opposing views of the per se approach to Section 1.
If the Court is indeed reassessing its approach to the per se rule under
Section 1, Trial Lawyers would certainly appear to signal a return to the
black letter approach that reached its zenith in the Court's pro-enforcement decisions of the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s." 9
B.

Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.

A resurgence of the per se rule, however, may be somewhat questiona75. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 432-33 (1990) (Brennan, J. dissenting).
76. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
77. See TrialLawyers, 493 U.S. at 424 n. 19.
78. Fox, The Future Of The Per Se Rule" Two Visions At War With One Another, 29
Washburn L.J. 200, 201 (1990).
79. See, e-g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151-52 (1968) (maximum price
fixing is per se illegal); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959) (boycotts and refusals to trade violate antitrust laws).
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ble, especially in light of Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.8"
Here the tables are turned, with Justice Brennan writing for the majority
and Justice Stevens filing an impassioned dissent.8 1 At first blush, ARCO
appears to deal with a different issue, one that has fascinated the Court in
recent years: the contours of the requirement that a private plaintiff
prove "antitrust injury" caused by defendant's violation. Established in
Brunswick Corp v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.11 and reaffirmed in other decisions, 3 the antitrust injury doctrine requires a private plaintiff to show
that his injury (or threatened injury in an injunctive case) is "of the type
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that [it] flow[ed] from
that which makes [the] defendants' acts unlawful." 84 Even though
ARCO primarily concerns "antitrust injury," the case's theoretical underpinning raises the significant question of whether, and if so, what degree of credence can be given to Trial Lawyers as an expression of the
Court's current attitude towards the per se rule against price fixing.
ARCO was a private damage action brought by USA Petroleum, an
independent operator of discount gasoline stations in California.85 The
claim was that in an effort to increase its dealers' sales in the face of
competition with discounters like the plaintiff, ARCO entered into a vertical conspiracy with its dealers setting a maximum resale price for
ARCO gasoline.86 As the case reached the Supreme Court, it was assumed as a fact that the agreed-upon price, while lower than what would
have prevailed in an unrestrained market, was not "predatory"-that is,
it was not so low as to give rise to liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act if the seller possessed or had a dangerous probability of acquiring monopoly power." The complaint alleged that the purpose of this
vertical maximum price-fixing conspiracy was to drive independents like
the plaintiff out of the California market. 88
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant, holding that even if the plaintiff could prove an unlawful conspiracy to drive
prices down, in the absence of predation, the plaintiff could not establish
that it suffered antitrust injury as a result of the defendants' violation of
Section 1.89 The Ninth Circuit reversed, ruling that injuries resulting
80. 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
81. Joining the majority opinion were Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Marshall,
Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Stevens was joined in his dissent by
Justice White.
82. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
83. The most notable case is Cargill,Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986). In Cargill,the Court extended the Brunswick rule, which had been established in
a treble-damage action, to actions seeking only injunctive relief. See id. at 113.
84. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489.
85. See Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1887-88
(1990).
86. See id. at 1888.

87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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from non-predatory maximum price-fixing agreements could constitute
antitrust injury.' ° The court of appeals reasoned that price fixing,
whatever its form, violates the Sherman Act because it was Congress'
intent that "market forces alone determine what goods and services are
offered, at what price these goods and services are sold, and whether particular sellers succeed or fail."9' 1 It followed that the plaintiff could show
injury flowing from that which made the conduct unlawful-and thus
establish antitrust injury-if it could establish that its loss resulted from
a disruption in market forces caused by the conspiracy: that is, that below-market prices resulted from a maximum price-fixing agreement.9 2
One would expect that a Court that had just decided TrialLawyers on
the same theory-that price fixing is always detrimental because it interferes with the market's price-setting function-would not have very
much difficulty affirming that holding. And that is precisely how the
author of Trial Lawyers, Justice Stevens, viewed the matter:
Unlike the prohibitions against monopolizing or underselling in violation of § 2 or [§ 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act], the gravamen of
the price-fixing conspiracy condemned by § I is unrelated to the level
of the administered price at any particular point in time. .. [T]he
reasonableness of the price set by an illegal conspiracy is wholly
irrele93
vant to whether the conspirators' work product is illegal.
When competitors are injured by illicit agreements among their rivals rather than by the free play of market forces, the antitrust laws
protect competitors
precisely for the purpose of protecting
9
competition.
That, of course, is language from Justice Stevens' dissent. It was Justice
Brennan, the minority spokesman in Trial Lawyers, who wrote for the
seven-Justice majority that reversed the Ninth Circuit and held that USA
Petroleum could not, as a matter of law, establish antitrust injury.
The majority opinion commences with a brief restatement of the antitrust injury principle: it is insufficient for a private plaintiff to establish
causation-in-fact between his injury and the defendant's violation; a
plaintiff must go further and show injury resulting from that which made
the defendants' conduct unlawful. 95 To determine whether USA Petroleum could satisfy that requirement, Justice Brennan turned to the sub90. USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 859 F.2d 687, 688 (9th Cir. 1988),
rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1884 (1990).
91. Id. at 693.
92. "USA's claimed injuries were the direct result, and, indeed, under the allegations
we accept as true, the intended objective, of ARCO's price-fixing scheme. According to
USA, the purpose of ARCO's price-fixing is to disrupt the market of retail gasoline sales,
and that disruption is the source of USA's injuries." Id.
93. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1899 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
94. Id.
95. See id. at 1889.
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stance of the underlying claim in the case: a vertical conspiracy to set
maximum resale prices.
As the law stood when ARCO was briefed and argued, vertical maximum price fixing, like its minimum price-fixing cousin, was per se unlawful. 9 That
was the Supreme Court's holding in 1968 in Albrecht v. Herald
6
Co.,
and neither party in ARCO asked the Court to overrule it. So
Justice Brennan turned to Justice White's opinion in Albrecht to see just
why it was that maximum price fixing had been declared categorically
anticompetitive and hence subject to a per se rule. He found three reasons: (1) impeding the buyer's ability to charge more than the seller
wants him to might intrude on the buyer's ability to survive in the market, thus lessening the number of competitors; (2) maximum prices might
be set at a level too low to permit the buyer to provide services that
consumers want and are willing to pay for; and (3) the maximum price, if
actually charged by all dealers, is likely to become an established price
throughout the market, with the same anticompetitive consequences as a
minimum price-fixing agreement.9 7 Because USA Petroleum was
ARCO's competitor, not a dealer or a consumer, its injury bore no relation to any of these underlying reasons for the Albrecht rule. Accordingly, USA Petroleum could not show antitrust injury. As Justice
Brennan explained, the plaintiff's losses did not "flow from the aspects of
vertical, maximum price fixing that render it illegal."" 8
The opinion nowhere suggests that the alleged vertical price fixing conspiracy, if proved at trial, would not be per se illegal. To the contrary,
per se illegality is presumed. 99 But the majority goes out of its way to
state that such arrangements cannot cause antitrust injury to a competitor if the agreement on a maximum price does not result in a price that is
predatory (which we can safely assume means, at the very least, a price
below some measure of cost)."°
96. 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968).
97. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S.Ct. 1884, 1890 (1990).

98. Id. at 1891. Justice Brennan's analysis of Albrecht omits a critical point. Justice
White-who, significantly, joined Justice Stevens' dissent in AR CO-commenced his discussion of the maximum price-fixing charge by quoting the following language from
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951): "agreements

to fix maximum prices no less than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of
traders and thereby restrain their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152 (1968) (quoting Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at
213). The Albrecht Court then added: "[w]e think Kiefer-Stewart was correctly decided
and we adhere to it." Id. To the extent that Albrecht is grounded upon the inherently
illegal nature of any restraint crippling the freedom of a trader to sell as he sees fit, its
rationale is surely not limited to the three elements identified by Justice Brennan in
ARCO.
99. See ARCO, 110 S.Ct. at 1889 n.5.

100. The opinion states that "[w]hen prices are not predatory, any losses flowing from
them cannot be said to stem from an anti-competitive aspect of the defendant's conduct."
Id. at 1892 (emphasis in original). Then following up in a footnote, the Court notes that
[w]e did not reach a contrary conclusion in Matsushita Electric IndustrialCo. v.

Zenith Radio Corp. where we declined to define precisely the term 'predatory
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Justice Brennan was unimpressed by the plaintiff's quotation from the
Maricopacase that the per se rule-which everyone agreed applied to the
defendant's conduct-is grounded "'on faith in price competition as a
market force [and not] on a policy of low selling prices at the price of
eliminating competition.'"101 Instead, Justice Brennan wrote that
"[1]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set,
and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury."'0 2
If the issue before the Court had been whether a maximum price-fixing
agreement should be per se unlawful, that would strike me as a rational
argument. One could sensibly maintain that the purpose of antitrust is
consumer welfare; that economic efficiency resulting in low prices is what
the competitive system should produce; and that unless a low price is
predatory and might ultimately lead to monopoly and high supra-competitive prices, it ought not be illegal to require a buyer to resell at no
higher than a specified maximum. Indeed, a number of scholars have
said as much.13
But if we start, as did the majority in ARCO, with the premise that
maximum price-fixing arrangements are per se illegal, it is difficult to
fathom how the Court could state that such arrangements "do not
threaten competition." Indeed, in attempting to explain his rejection of
the plaintiff's argument that injuries caused in fact by per se offenses
always constitute "antitrust injury," Justice Brennan restates the timehonored justification for per se rules in language that, on its very face,
belies his earlier conclusion: the per se rule
represents a "long-standing judgment that the prohibited practices by
their nature have a 'substantial potential for impact on competition.'"
"Once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court
to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it, it
has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is
unreasonable."

104

If we apply this language, culled from a number of prior Supreme
Court decisions, to the ARCO facts, it appears that the Court has gained
enough experience to predict with confidence that a non-predatory vertipricing' but stated instead that '[flor purposes of this case it is enough to note
that respondents have not suffered an antitrust injury unless petitioners conspired to drive respondents out of the relevant markets by (i) pricing below the
level necessary to sell their products, or (ii) pricing below some appropriate
measure of cost.'
Id. at 1892-93 n.10 (citation omitted).
101. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884, 1891 (1990) (quoting Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982)).
102. Id. at 1892 (emphasis added).
103. See, &g., Page, The Scope Of Liability For Antitrust Violations, 37 Stan. L. Rev.

1445, 1469-70 (1985) (arguing that maximum price fixing, whether vertical or horizontal,
should not give rise to antitrust injury because it does not result from inefficiency).
104. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. Ct. 1884. 1893 (1990) (citations omitted).
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cal maximum price-fixing agreement will be condemned by the Rule ol,
Reason because of its substantial potential for impact on competition.
Otherwise, the Court could not properly apply a per se rule, which it is
clearly doing. How, then, can the majority conceivably hold that so long
as prices are above predatory levels, they "do not threaten competition"?
While this conclusion may be somewhat puzzling, I think it is also
clear that the Court does not really mean what it says. The opinion, in
its exegesis of Albrecht, explains that maximum price-fixing arrangements between seller and buyer can be anticompetitive in the three ways
Justice Brennan outlined. Nonetheless, it does not follow, as a matter of
logic, that a per se illegal offense-which admittedly can cause antitrust
injury to dealers and possibly to consumers--cannot cause such injury to
a competitor who is driven out of business as a result and, indeed, is
alleged to have been the target of the arrangement. I could well understand a rule that Section 1 is not violated by a conspiracy to charge low
but not predatory prices for the purpose of injuring a competitor--or, at
the very least, that the Rule of Reason should apply to such an arrangement. It is quite a different matter, however, for the Court to declare
that such conduct is inevitably anticompetitive, and hence unlawfuleven if there is no proof that any one of Justice Brennan's three concerns
is present-when at the same time it declares that a competitor who is
injured as a direct result of the agreed-upon prices has not been harmed
by that which made the conspiracy unlawful in the first place. If the
rationale of Socony- Vacuum, as epitomized in footnote 59, represents the
state of the law, then it is the agreement's tampering with the market's
price-setting mechanism that makes the conduct violative of the Sherman
Act. If that is the case, the competitor injured by the agreed-upon prices
is injured by that which makes the conspiracy unlawful. That is the crux
of the inconsistency between Trial Lawyers and ARCO.
Perhaps Justice Brennan is entitled to some leeway for what appears to
be a logical difficulty within his opinion. After all, he dissented in Trial
Lawyers and deliberately avoided aligning himself with Justice Stevens'
categorical equation of the per se rule with statutory mandate, the rejection of the idea that per se proscription is only a matter of administrative
convenience, and the reaffirmation of Socony Vacuum's rationale for the
prohibition of all price fixing as impermissible tampering with the economy's central nervous system. And Justice Stevens, who dissented in
ARCO, is certainly not guilty of inconsistency. But it is difficult to
square the positions of those Justices who joined both majorities-Justices Scalia, O'Connor and Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist. If the
price-fixing boycott in Trial Lawyers was per se illegal despite the assumed absence of market power because only the unrestrained market
may be permitted to set the price of a product or a service, then it should
follow that a vertical maximum price-fixing agreement is per se illegal for
the same reason, and not merely for those set forth by Justice White in
Albrecht.
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The fact that the ARCO conspiracy was vertical while the Trial Lawyers case involved a horizontal arrangement is insignificant. As Justice
Stevens points out in hisARCO dissent, the result inARCO should be the
same if the conspiracy not to charge more than a specified maximum
price were horizontal among all of the ARCO dealers and not vertically
imposed by their common supplier."0 5 In either case, the competitive
injury, or absence thereof, would be the same, and thus they should receive the same treatment from the law. Indeed, Justice Brennan's argument that "[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices
are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not
threaten competition"" 6 applies both to horizontal as well as vertical
arrangements.
One cannot read ARCO without wondering whether the majority of
the Justices really believe that, as a matter of substantive law, the per se
rule ought to apply to a vertical maximum price-fixing scheme but are
unwilling to come right out and say so by overruling Albrecht. More
significantly, the case may signal acceptance by the Court's majority of
an antitrust outlook that focuses on consumer welfare as the Alpha and
Omega of Sherman-Act concern and permits restraints that are not likely
to injure consumers somewhere down the road. There certainly is
enough language in the ARCO opinion to support such a conclusion.
CONCLUSION

It might be good public policy to limit the ambit of per se antitrust
doctrine to anticompetitive conduct that is highly likely to injure consumers. And it might be equally good policy to permit underpaid public
defenders to use coercive pressure to persuade their governmental customers to raise their rates of pay-particularly when the D.C. Superior
Court lawyers, had they been employees of the Legal Aid Society, could
have gone on strike without any antitrust concern. In confronting these
troubling policy issues, I fear that Trial Lawyers and ARCO have produced results that are difficult to rationalize. Whether that is because the
Justices do not have small minds and consistency would have been foolish I leave to the reader.
FUNCTIONAL
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